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.ESSAYS

THE RHETORIC OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Donald N. McCloskey*
Economics and law have contrasting rhetorics, which is one reason
perhaps why economics has become influential in law. It is a new way
of arguing, and lawyers are on the watch for new ways of arguing.
These "rhetorics" are not always bad. "Rhetoric" here is not
merely ornament and trickery, but all persuasion, from arithmetic to
moral character. We humans must decide what arguments we find
persuasive. The lawyer's appeal to stare decisis or the economist's
claim to scientific status are rhetorical acts, good or bad. I want to
argue that economics is a sweet science, but the rhetoric of science in
economics is mainly bad, not least because it makes lawyers feel like
unscientific imbeciles.
Economics, like mathematics, thinks it uses no rhetoric but logic.
One takes premises that someone else is willing to grant and then
"proves" some theorem in the usual ways, by construction or by contradiction. The ways of proof are individual, gripping the mind of the
individual reasoner. At their most social they are only dialectic
(Greek: pick out; converse) - which is the classical name for logic,
not "dialectic" in the open sense of Hegel. Dialectic does not view
itself as social. Plato's dialectic needs only two people, a victim and a
Socratic arguer. Society or culture does not matter for the argument;
or so it seems. One could reason logically or dialectically on a desert
island, with Friday standing there to nod his head in admiration and
say from time to time "panu ge, Sokrates." Economists believe they
use Robinson Crusoe reasoning.
Socrates described it with the word elenchos - the individual refutation, the reductio ad impossibile. Elenchos first meant in Greek "dishonor" or "disgrace," especially by speech. The rhetoric of the
"compelling" proof is not gently "persuasive," as in Latin persuadeo
from the same root as "sweet." On the contrary, it is authoritarian,
browbeating, shaming, anything but sweet. As James Boyd White
* Professor of Economics and History, University of Iowa. B.A. 1964, Ph.D. (Economics)
1970, Harvard. - Ed. An earlier version was presented in March 1986 as the Sunderland Fellow Lecture at the University of Michigan Law School. I thank the Law School for its indulgence. I thank James Boyd White for his comments on a written draft, and the participants in a
seminar at Washington University in late 1987 for wise suggestions.
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says of the elenchos, "What matters between us is not the other witnesses who can be brought forward to support your view or mine but
whether you can make me your witness or I can make you mine." 1 In
legal terms the elenchos is cross-examination, to be contrasted with
evidence of third parties or appeals to rules of law.
An example of logical, Robinson Crusoe reasoning, classical in
every sense, is the proof that the square root of two cannot be calculated as the ratio of two integers. The victim examines the proof. After some quiet thought she surrenders to its force, or surrenders at
least if she accepts the law of the excluded middle. Likewise in economics the proof of the existence and stability of competitive equilibrium or the proof of the rationality of altruism appears to be a piece of
logic. If you grant me this or that assumption I can force you to testify against your own doubts that economies work as the economists
say. The elenchos is formal logic.
The law, by contrast, if not always the scholarship of lawyers
(although the two seem to be models for one another), uses what I
shall call for a moment "social reasoning." That is, it uses reasoning
that makes essential use of our position as members of a community.
It is not Robinson Crusoe logic but so to speak Boulean logic, to be
used in the Boule, or Council, at Athens. The most obvious example
of Boulean logic in the law is the use of witnesses, strictly irrelevant to
the operation of the other, dialectic logic (in which it is not supposed
to matter in the proof that a reliable witness says that the square root
of two is irrational). There are other cases, as I shall note in a moment, most especially the heavy use of analogy in the law. One could
call the social discourse, as Socrates and Plato did, "rhetoric." The
rhetor in Greece and Rome was above all a lawyer. The descendants
of the rhetors are professors of English, communications, and law.
So economics claims to be "dialectical" in the 6reek sense ("logical" in the modem sense), but law is "rhetorical."2 One could demonstrate - dialectically or rhetorically - that economists consider
themselves bound only by dialectic, while legal scholars and judges
consider themselves bound by rhetoric. It is noticeable that economists, even when talking about legal matters, will seize on the narrow1. J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 102 (1984).

2. I apologize for the laymanly mixing up oflaw in courts with law in books and in the minds
of legal scholars. The word "law," unlike the pair "economics" and "the economy," has that
maddening but suggestive ambiguity of the word "history," used to name the study of the thing
as well as the thing itself. In "history" it is raised to a further level of confusion because the
writings that are histories of events have themselves a history, as law has laws, though with the
distinct name of jurisprudence.
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est reasoning they can find, sidestepping many of the issues (by plea of
nolo contendere) and stating their arguments as compelling "theorems." Lawyers, even when talking about economics, will argue any
point, with any reasoning that seems persuasive, in a lawyerly way. 3
The one sort of reasoning, then, I have called dialectical or logical,
the other rhetorical or social.4 Four points about these reasonings:
First, as was just argued, the law is social. Second, the logical, Robinson Crusoe reasoning in our culture sneers at social reasoning. Therefore, third, economic reasoning sneers at legal reasoning. But, fourth,
economic argument after all is social, too. I am arguing that we are all
social reasoners together, we economists and lawyers. If economics is
to influence legal scholarship it had better do so because the arguments are humanly persuasive (as, I must say, they commonly are),
not merely because they satisfy some timeless criterion of scientific,
logical reasoning.
In academic talk and in textbooks on logic the social reasoning
that characterizes law is gathered under "Fallacies":
• The circumstantial ad hominem argument, for example, is the
figure "practice what you preach." The personal circumstances of the
mathematician, we would usually say in logic, are irrelevant to the
persuasive power of his proof. But when an excellent economist at
Yale who had testified in an antitrust suit was discovered by the opposition lawyers to have written to the contrary in a scholarly journal his
troubles were more than intellectual. And it is of course common
practice in the street as much as in the courts of law to try to undermine an argument by showing that the advocate or witness does not
herself practice it. A doctor testifying in court against a cigarette company would not be a useful witness if she had to step down from time
to time for a smoke.
• The argumentum ad baculum, the appeal to the cudgel, is the
appeal to the force of jail or other punishment. No one will put you in
jail if you speak against the irrationality of the square root of two, or
even if you act on your speech by approximating the square root of
two by a decimal. (One is reminded of the bill said to have been put
before an American state legislature that would have rounded pi to 3.0
to make calculations easier.) But someone most assuredly will jail you
3. I am thinking of Richard Posner, Robert Bork, Guido Calabresi, Walter Blum, and Harry
Kalven, Jr.
4. Modern philosophy makes a narrower distinction between formal and informal logic, for
which see D. WALTON, ARGUER'S POSITION: A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF AD HOM/NE/If ATTACK,
CRITICISM, REFUTATION, AND FALLACY (1985); and R. JOHNSON & J.A. BLAIR, LOGICAL SELF
DEFENSE (1983).
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if you speak up in court against the authority of a judge, or if you
speak up in public against some economist in a libelous way. Again
the argument is used differentially in the law as practiced and the law
as studied. There are no jail sentences for errors in law reviews,
although readers doubtless would favor three to five years of hard time
for certain authors. But we have other sanctions, other cudgels
against colleagues who violate the laws of scholarship - noting that
the sanctions do not appear to work so well when challenged boldly, as
recently by the Critical Legal Studies professors at fair Harvard. We
certainly have sanctions against the students. So again law in the
courts and classrooms uses "fallacious" reasoning.
• The argumentum ad verecundiam, "the appeal to reverence," is
the argument from authority, the worst form of "mere rhetoric," at
least by the canons of a rhetoric that makes first-order predicate logic
the only reasoning. Robinson Crusoe logic says that it scorns authority, which recommends it to the fierce individualists of the West. No
appeal seems to be permitted to authorities outside the affi.rmer and
the contradictor. Yet the "fallacious" appeal to authority is obviously
and properly effective in court, and only less so in law reviews. (The
bizarre system of citation practiced in legal scholarship appears to be
an appeal to authority, in a mass.) As Coke on Littleton says, "Argumentum ab authoritate est fortissimum in lege," most strong indeed. 5
• A related falla,Py popular among lawyers is that witnesses and
juries count, and even mere majorities of these. The argumentum ad
populum, by a majority of good men and true, has no force in narrow
logic, but great force in social reasoning. Socrates chides Polus for his
lawyerly ways: My gifted friend, I reject your reasoning
because you attempt to refute me in rhetorical fashion, as they understand refuting in the law courts. For there, one party is supposed to refute the other when they bring forward a number of reputable witnesses
. . . . But this sort of refutation is quite worthless for getting at the truth;
since occasionally a man may actually be crushed by the number and
reputation of the false witnesses brought against him. 6

To be sure, he may be crushed, as was Socrates. But considering that
the aristocratic quest for certainty initiated by Socrates has not attained its object, some 2400 years into the program, it seems reasonable in the meantime to decide with numbers and reputations as much
as with syllogisms. As Coke said, ''[o]mnis conclusio boni & veri
judicii sequitur ex bonis & veris praemissis et dictis juratorum, " 1 every
5. 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY
UPON LITILETON 254a (19th ed. 1832) [hereinafter COKE ON LITTLETON].
6. PLATO, GORGIAS 471 E-472A (W.R.M. Lamb trans. 1983) (emphasis added).
7. 2 COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note 5, at 226.

,
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conclusion of a good and true judgment follows from good and true
premises, and the sayings ofjurors.
• Law and ordinary life - even ordinary academic life - are filled
with "ethical appeals," that is, arguments from the ethos of the
speaker, from his or her character. In formal logic it would seem ridiculous to claim that a good mathematician will do well to be a good
person, or that if an economist is seen to be a bad man his economics
will be rendered in some way doubtful. But ethical appeals are made
daily in legal proceedings, as in life. It is often not irrelevant that a
witness is a well-kllown fool or liar (even in formal logic if a Cretan
says that all Cretans are liars we are in some difficulty). An expert
witness is given special weight, and in legal scholarship the argument
of someone without a law degree is suspect. As Coke said, "cuilibet in
sua arte perito est credendum, " whosoever is skilled in his art is to be
credited, and especially whosoever is skilled in the art of law. 8
• The argument a fortiori involves often the fallacy of a missing
premise, a premise furthermore which formal logic disavows: namely,
that an order of rigor from minor to major governs the comparison of
cases. In Talmudic argument it is called kal ve-chomer, the relation of
weighty to trivial, the first two rules of interpretation in the systems of
Hillel the Elder and of Rabbi Ishmael. Miriam spoke against her
brother Moses, for which the Lord made her leprous. The question
arose how long she was to be shut out from the camp. The Lord answered, "If her father had but spit in her face would she not be
ashamed seven days? [A fortiori, then] let her be shut from the camp
seven days, and after that let her be received in again." 9 As Moses
Mielziner notes, "Here an inference is made from minor to major,
namely, from a human father's to the Lord's disfavor." 10 He quotes
Coke on Littleton: 11 Quod in minori valet, valebit in majori; et quod in
majori non valet nee valebit in minori'~· What has force in a minor
matter will have force in a major; and what does not have it in a major
matter will not have it in a minor.
• Above all there is analogy, precedent. Analogy has no status in
the simpler forms of logic that are usually taken as the very meaning
of logicality. But analogy is obviously the very meaning of law, especially common law: Edward Levi was not saying anything startling
when he remarked that jurists argue by "the controlling similarity be8. 1 COKE ON LITILETON, supra note s, at 125.
9. Numbers 12:14.
10. M. MIELZINER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD 131 (1968).
11. Id. (quoting 2 COKE ON LITILETON, supra note 5, at 260).
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tween the present and prior case ...." 12 Yet there is no syllogistic
form, except perhaps in fuzzy sets, that goes "All beings similar to
men are mortal; Socrates is analogous to a man; therefore Socrates is
probably mortal." To such logic-mongering Coke replied, "argumentum a simili valet in lege," 13 an argument from similarity is valid in
law, however invalid it is said to be in logic.
One could go on. Take down a modem elementary textbook on
logic - Copi's standard book, for example - and slowly read the
section on "fallacies." 14 Try to ignore the authoritarian and dismissive rhetoric with which the philosophers treat the "fallacies," and ask
yourself - Are these not in fact the usual forms of legal reasoning?
Are they really all wrong, to be discarded in serious conversation? Or
should we rather make distinctions between good analogies and bad,
good arguments from authority and bad, good rhetoric and bad? 15
However one comes out of that mental experiment it is clear why
the reasoning that economists claim to offer the law has such prestige.
The intellectual traditions in which lawyers are educated as undergraduates tell them that the ways of legal reasoning are "fallacious,"
and that the only really correct way to argue is logically, mathematically, dialectically, by elenchos on a desert island. Education before
law school says that reasoning is a matter of "logic and evidence,"
defined in certain ways pleasing to Rene Descartes, a mathematician,
and to Francis Bacon, a lawyer (though no friend to Coke's common
law).
Though he practiced it: Bacon claimed to dislike the richly argumentative ways of Shakespearean England. He urged what T.S. Eliot
called the dissociation of sensibilities, the severing of argument from
personal experience. The unified sensibility in common discourse and
metaphysical poetry was to be set aside: "the mind is already, through
the daily intercourse and conversation of life, occupied with unsound
doctrines," 16 the "specious meditations, speculations, and glosses in
which men indulge." 17 The Baconian mind would be a mirror of nature; at present "the minds of men are strangely possessed and beset,
so that there is no true and even surface left to reflect the genuine ray
12. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7 (1948).
13. 2 COKE ON LITTLETON, supra note 5, at 19la.
14. See I. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 86-126 (1978).
15. Cf D. WALTON, supra note 4; w. BOOTH & M. GREGORY, THE HARPER AND Row
RHETORIC: WRITING AS THINKING, THINKING AS WRITING ch. 13 (1987).
16. F. BACON, The Great lnstauration, and The New Organon, in FRANCIS BACON: A SELECTION OF His WORKS 327 (S. Warhaft ed. 1978).
17. Id. at 333.
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ofthings." 18 The unassisted "human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly distorts and discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it." 19 The solution is to
submit the mind to a machine, "not left to [the mind's] own course,
but guided at every step, and the business done as if by machinery." 20
In this way we will achieve "not pretty and probable conjectures, but
certain and demonstrable knowledge." 21 The imprisonment of the
mind will set it free. "The understanding must not therefore be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weights to keep it from leaping
and fl.ying." 22
As Amelie Oksenberg Rorty has remarked recently about
Descartes, Bacon's assault on rhetoric makes an assault on itself, for
he "found himself using the very modes he intended to attack." 23
Descartes, too, was reacting to rhetoric, but "[d]espite his austere recommendations about the methods of discovery and demonstration, he
hardly ever followed those methods, hardly ever wrote in the same
genre twice." 24 The same mischievous observation might be made of
modern Cartesians and Baconians: namely, that a fuller rhetoric
(which would use the "fallacies" when reasonable people were persuaded by them) is rejected in philosophy and economics by appeal to
the very fallacies to be disallowed, such as an appeal to an analogy
between a mathematical model and an economy or an appeal to an
image of the human mind as a mirror. The antirhetoricians argue
with an unexamined rhetoric against the rhetorical tradition.
After a general education dominated by the men of the early seventeenth century, the lawyer of the late twentieth century laboriously
acquires nonetheless a richer way of arguing about product liability or
criminal evidence, and tries not to worry too much when the way of
arguing seems disjoint from her earlier studies of logic. But at length
she is told by some smart aleck from the Economics Department that,
after all, this legal thinking about economic or social matters is mere
anecdote and tale-telling, not real science.
Economics participates in the false rhetoric against rhetoric. The
prestige of the seventeenth-century program encourages the economist
Id. at 317.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 364.
23. Rorty, Experiments in Philosophic Genre: Descartes' Meditations, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

545, 548 (1983).
24. Id.
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to sneer at legal reasoning, on the grounds that legal reasoning is social
and rhetorical, not the splendid Robinson Crusoe reasoning we are all
so thankful for and use so seldom. Yet the economist is vulnerable to
rhetorical attack, in particular the tu quoque (so's your uncle) and the
circumstantial ad hominem (put your money where your mouth is).
Economic reasoning, too, is social and rhetorical. So's your economics teacher. Economics itself uses intensively the "fallacious" figures
of speech. Economist, know thy own rhetoric.
Economics, which claims officially to argue by logic alone, appealing to Robinson Crusoe sitting in his cave, in fact argues also in the
social way. Indeed, the only reason for making the distinction between narrowly logical, Crusoe reasoning and social, rhetorical reasoning is to throw over the distinction itself, to throw over the
prejudice that reasoning must be something more transcendental than
honest participation in a community of speech and other laws. To
coin a phrase, the prophecies of what the court of informed opinion
will do are what I mean by reasoning.
It is always so. The interpretation and use of "logic" will always
depend on the culture. My ten-year-old daughter had a textbook published by Midwest Publications in Pacific Grove, California, called
Mindbenders, little puzzles in well formed formulas. As in the game
Wff 'nProof, reasoning is identified with logic. The young minds are to
be bent towards deduction, learning for instance a great deal more
than one would care to know about the possible arrangements of first
and last names. The educators at Midwest Publications, however,
know they are dealing with children and know they must make explicit the rhetorical premises of the logic. The section entitled "General Comments About Clues" urges the children to
Think of standards which are generally acceptable to U.S. society as a
whole. Use common sense and context in deciding what the clues mean .
. . . Assume that only males have male names. . . . [I]f John went on
a date with Abbott, assume . . . Abbott is a female, since it is not generally acceptable for a male to "date" a male.

The point has been made well by Richard Harvey Brown, citing Garfinkel's detailed studies of reasoning in jury rooms. He notes that
logic, procedure, rationality are not available before a trial, simply to
be applied. They emerge. "Thus rationality, rather than being a guiding rule of individual or social life, turns out to be an achievement - a
symbolic product that is constructed through speech and actions that
in themselves are nonrational." 25 Perhaps it is not so much nonratio25. Brown, Reason as Rhetorical: On Relations Among Epistemology, Discourse, and Practice, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 194 (J. Nelson, A. Megill & D. McCloskey,
eds. 1987).
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nal as a-rational, or entailing a rationality more complex than fits comfortably on a 3 X 5 card.
An example of the point turning back on economics itself is socalled "rational expectations." The argument is that the economy anticipates on average whatever can be profitably anticipated by economists. That is~ the economy is nobody's fool. In particular, it is not
the economist's fool. An economist cannot predict the interest rate,
for instance, because other and better informed participants in the
bond market have every incentive to predict it before the economist
does. You see, if the economy is nobody's fool it is not as easy to
manipulate as we once thought.
Most economists who have come recently to respect this argument
(and I am one o( them) think they respect it on mathematical and
econometric grounds. Yet the real reason they do, when they do, is
that it is an argument from circumstantial ad hominem. Like most
economists I consid~r such an argument to be powerful. But in the
way of ad hominem arguments it is less impressive to outsiders. The
argument is The American Question: if you're so smart, oh economist
who thinks the economy is a fool, why ain't you rich? An economist
who could predict interest rates would be fabulously wealthy. Such a
one would make Ferdinand Marcos look like a Bowery bum. No
economist is fabulously wealthy (an exception was Otto Eckstein, but
he got wealthy by selling the alleged predictions, not by acting on
them). Therefore no economist can predict interest rates. Therefore
the economy does as well as professors do in prediction. Q.E.D. 26
So economics uses rhetoric. That is an imprecise way of putting
the matter. Only partly do we "use" rhetoric. As Coleridge said, we
do not speak the language; the language speaks us. There is no way to
be "nonrhetorical," to stand entirely outside the traditions of argument and "use" rhetoric to "communicate" the "substance" of argument. Plato imagined a point on which to stand outside of human
discourse. He assaulted the law professors of his day (by the name of
sophists) because they said that man, not God, was the measure of
man's sayings. His portrayal of the sophist/lawyers is still credited by
the sort of reader who gets his evidence about women and the Midwest
from H.L. Mencken. Rhetoric, to repeat, is not merely the ornament
one adds into the speech at the end, and it is not necessarily dishonest.
It is the whole of argument - its logic, its arrangement, its appeals to
authority, its passion, its pointed lack of passion, its audience, its pur26. Cf. Mccloskey, If You're So Smart: Economics and the Limits of Criticism, AM.
(forthcoming).
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pose, its statistics, its poetry. Of course economics, and therefore law
and economics, will be "rhetorical."
You can see this in any passage taken at random. I take this one,
very obscure:
Our survey of the major common law fields suggests that the common law exhibits a deep unity that is economic in character. . . . The
common law method is to allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as to maximize the joint
value . . . of the activities. . . .
... [T]he judge can hardly fail to consider whether the loss was the
product of wasteful, uneconomical resource use. In a culture of scarcity,
this is an urgent, an inescapable question. 27

Look at these words as a piece of scholarly poetry. Go back to your
freshman English course and read them for their effect. Recall that
reading a poem for its effect is not a hostile act. Unhappily, there is a
rhetoric of rhetoric in its usual sense, of hostile debunking. We point
with a smirk to the President's "heated rhetoric" and are well satisfied
with ourselves for having unveiled his nasty tricks. But literary criticism has a deeper and more sympathetic function. ·scrutinizing a text
is not necessarily hostile. Indeed; I choose Posner in order to lean
against the presumption of hostility, because I am largely persuaded
by his arguments, the more so because he taught himself economics
and ancient Greek as an adult.
The argument in the passage is carried in part by the equivocal use
of economic vocabulary: "allocate," "maximize," "value," and "scarcity" are technical words in economics, with precise definitions, but
here they are used also in wider senses, to evoke a sense of scientific
power, to claim precision without necessarily using it. The sweetest
turn is the use of "uneconomical," which is not in fact a technical
word in economics, but encapsulates the argument that judges follow
economic models because to do otherwise would be "wasteful." The
"economical/uneconomical" figure of speech supports the claim that
economic arguments (arguments about scarcity) are pervasive in the
law, hammering it home by treble repetition (technically, commoratio): first in this word "uneconomical"; then in the reference to a culture of scarcity (a nice echo of "a culture of poverty," that, from the
other side of the tracks); and finally in the repetition of "urgent,
inescapable."
People involved mutually in automobile accidents or breaches of
contract are said to be "engaged in interacting activities." The inter27. R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98-99 (1972).
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action, however, does not extend to the political or moral systems of
the society. A rancher and a railroad "interact," but a judge does not
"interact" with people who think that big enterprises like railroads are
blameworthy. A vocabulary of "engaging in interacting activities"
makes an appeal to the character of scientist or observer (technically,
as I have noted, an "ethical" argument). It sounds clinical. But it
carries with it a philosophy of community. The words matter to the
argument. Style is substantive.
Again, the passage uses the metaphor of "deepness" in unity, as do
other arguments trying to change the way we categorize the world. A
critical legal theorist will tell you that the "deep" structure of law is an
apology for capitalism. The legal economist will tell you, as here, that
the "deep" structure is on the contrary a celebration of capitalism.
And so forth: one could in this way examine the texts of law and
economics rhetorically, asking who are its implied readers, what
genres it draws on and creates, whether there is a text in this class.
Finally, then, I've done it. You've been waiting all this time for me
to say something impolite about my friend Richard Posner and other
devotees of law and economics. To lay out his prose this way is certainly impolite. After all, that's what "rhetoric" means, right? "Rhetoric" means sneaky words. Those economists and their fellow
travelers use "rhetoric," don't they, while the good guys use simple
logic and evidence? Right? O.K.?
No: Wrong. Not O.K. If you still have these rhetorical expectations I have not been making myself clear. "Rhetoric," the way I have
been using it here, and the way it is increasingly used in such conversations, as it was used anciently, is not necessarily bad talk. The badtalk rap, I have noted, was hung on rhetoric by Plato. Plato was such
a good advocate - such a good rhetorician when making merry of
rhetoricians, as Cicero put it - that rhetoric was banished from the
more elevated parts of the conversation of mankind for two thousand
years, and especially in the past three hundred.
Rhetoric reached its nadir of prestige in the 1930s and 1940s, when
it became virtually another word for irrational anger and state propaganda. In her little introductory book of 1943 on logic, L. Susan Stebbing orated angrily against the orator, whose aim, she said, "is to
induce belief at all costs" and whose "appeal is not to reason but to
uncontrolled emotion, not to considerations logically relevant but to
prejudice."28 At a time when Axis armies were still occupying large
parts of Russia and the Pacific, and seemed to have gotten there in
28. L.S. STEBBING, A MODERN ELEMENTARY LOGIC 160 (1943).
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part by manipulating public opinion, one can excuse Stebbing's anaphora, indignatio, antirhesis, and other uncontrolled emotion directed
against uncontrolled emotion. But it must be evident that badness in
talk is a result of being a bad person, like Hitler or Tojo, not a result of
using a bad method. Good or bad, we all use rhetoric. Law is rhetoric. Economics is rhetoric. Mathematics is rhetoric.
So I'm not saying that Posner is uniquely "rhetorical" in the way
he writes. That is not the point of looking closely at his passage. The
point is merely that we are all rhetorical, the most sober and antirhetorical among us.
Rhetoric is not a fault to be overcome. On the contrary, the rhetoric of the field called law and economics is unusually healthy, at any
rate if the field is viewed from economics. There are fields of economics in which the examination of evidence counts for little (such as international trade) or in which certain styles of argument are
discouraged without proper airing (such as macroeconomics). It will
be shocking for the enemies of law and economics to hear this, but an
economist reading in the field is delighted by the breadth of the reasoning to be found there. It reminds him of economic history. Both
are hybrids in which economists try to contribute to a radically different field, and so change economics. In trying such a difficult feat they
find themselves adopting some of the foreign rhetoric. You will find
that economic historians are nearly the only economists serious about
the birth of institutions. Likewise, economists in law and economics
are nearly the only economists serious about the adult life of institutions. It is by blending rhetorics that law and economics achieves its
best work. And the work is good for economics, giving it a model of
cumulative work in science. Two cheers for the rhetoric of law and
economics.
That is not, however, to say that I do not have something a little
impolite to say about Posner and company, admirable though they
are. For all their breadth acquired from law they might well rein in
one of their rhetorical practices taken from economics - their use of
the scientistic appeal. The particular variety of scientism that tempts
law and economics is "positive economics." Most mainstream economists subscribe to it, though it is at present on the defensive, especially
in econometrics.
Incidentally, I do not believe Posner is personally to blame for
such philosophical misdemeanors. Through no fault of his own he fell
into bad company on the south side of Chicago - a compassionate
argument that I am sure he now applies from the bench when dealing
with other young men gone wrong. The bad company was George
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Stigler, a very fine economist who leads the philosophers of positive
economics. Stigler never quite succeeded in shaking all the legal sense
out of Posner.
Stigler and other methodologists who huddle around the corpse of
logical positivism have succeeded better in overcoming sense elsewhere in economics. Positive economics was useful for a time, up to
about 1965, in forcing economists into a narrow program worth attempting. But it was and is a sort of voluntary imbecility, as the crystallographer and philosopher Michael Polanyi described it. It was the
bad rhetoric that only a narrow range of reasoning is needed because
only the narrow reasoning is properly scientific. The rhetoric has had
a disastrous effect on scholarly standards in Chicago school economics
(which I otherwise espouse, to my cost), and would have made such a
career as Ronald Coase's impossible. Under such a methodology it
does not matter whether an argument is rich or relevant or persuasive.
We are to be nourished on certain scraps of utilitarian ethics, certain
demonstrably irrelevant statistical tests, and certain rules of evidence
enshrined in the oldest law books of positivism and behaviorism.
It is about time that we economists stopped limiting conversation
by arbitrary philosophical rules: do not use questionnaires; consult
only quantitative evidence; pretend to derive every "observable implication" from a higher order hypothesis. A Chinese sage was walking
by the fish pond with his disciple. The sage said: "See how the fish
play: they are happy." "But, honored one, how do you know they are
happy? You are not a fish." "How do you know I don't know? You
are not me." A ruder and more modern story makes the same point.
A man and woman, strictly positivist and behaviorist in their intellectual lives, make love. The man says to the woman, "You enjoyed that
... did I?"
The rhetorical advantages of the positivistic move were two: first,
it used the ethical appeal to the character of the scientist, a potent one
in our culture. The rhetoric of the scientific paper since Newton has
said "I am a scientist: give way." Positive economics simulates science, and shares in its prestige. The second rhetorical advantage was
that, by reducing it to a set of rules remembered from a college course
in the philosophy of science, the positivists made economic science
dead easy. Positive economics asks only that the scientist produce observations "consistent with" his maintained hypothesis. Never mind
how plausible or implausible the hypothesis may be on other grounds.
The other grounds are ruled out of court. The problem with such
narrowing of the rhetoric is that most observations of, say, the lay of
the land are "consistent with" the hypothesis that the earth is flat.
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Mere "consistency" is worth a look, to be sure, and is not to be
scorned, but is seldom a powerful test.
Positive economics claims that it pursues high scholarly standards,
staking out the lofty and desiccated heights of logic and measurement,
pure Robinson Crusoe reasoning out of time and culture. But such
techniques are easy, not hard. The standards of argument are made
lower, not higher. Any fool can learn to set a first derivative equal to
zero or to run the local regression package. The evidence accumulated
on the point is conclusive. It is harder, as a logical and as an empirical
matter, to range over both terrains, over the sweet valleys of persuasion and the peaks of proof. Positive economics urges economists to
stick with the easy arguments. My regression coefficients are significant at the .01 level: don't bother me with ethics, analogy, testimony,
or intellectual tradition.
Economics itself would expect easy arguments to encourage entry.
That's what happened. Anyone can set up as an economic scientist:
"Look, I have a coefficient here statistically significantly different from
zero: promote me." Or, "Since my argument is merely that the common law behaves as if it were trying to achieve efficiency I do not have
to inquire into the motives of judges or attorneys to prove it: promote
me." Positive economics is a formula for publication. But unhappily it
is not a formula for insight. As a distinguished Chicago economist,
the late Harry Johnson, once put it: "[T]he methodology of positive
economics was an ideal methodology for justifying work that produced apparently surprising results without feeling obliged to explain
just why they occurred."29
You may wonder what all this has to do with the pragmatic matter
of the fit of economics to law. Nothing of what I have said implies
that it is a bad idea for lawyers to take seriously the conversations of
economists. I offer my opinion - not worth much on this matter, and
therefore not much of an argument ad verecundiam - that economic
thinking has a great deal to give to legal thinking. Partly this is a
market test. The consumers have spoken. In his Maccabean lecture
on jurisprudence in 1981, Guido Calabresi reported the current opinion that law and economics was the only sure route to promotion and
tenure.
More seriously, I do not see how a law school can get along without economists. (The weight of this remark would be reduced if I
were to admit that I also do not see how a law school can get along
29. Johnson, The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter Revolution, AM. EcoN.
REV., May 1971, at 1, 13.
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without statisticians and historians and rhetoricians and accountants
and sociologists and philosophers and English professors; so set aside
that testimony.) Being self-conscious about the rhetoric of economics
and being alert to its possible misuses is not a reason to abandon it.
That economics can be misused, and for rhetorical purposes represented as a nonmoral science like meteorology, does not make it useless. As Aristotle said of rhetoric itself: "And if it be objected that
one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that
is a charge which may be made in common against all good things
except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful. " 30
Law deals much with economic matters. The law of torts has been
much illuminated since Calabresi, Coase, and Posner spoke out loud
and bold. To take another example, apparently remote and assuredly
grisly, it is hard to see how one can think clearly about the use of body
parts after death without at least considering the option of leaving the
matter to economic forces and the right of a person to the residuary
estate, so to speak, of his corpse.
So law and economics is a good idea, and anyway a successful one.
Economics certainly has a lot to say to law. The other point, however,
and my main one here, is that law has a lot to say to economics. A
field law-and-economics that knew its own rhetoric would be a messenger from law to economics, too. Wayne Booth, a literary critic,
wrote: "[T]he processes developed in the law are codifications of reasonable processes that we follow in every part of our lives, even the
scientific." 31 So it is. In other words, the first and best thing that economics can learn from law is the breadth of reasoning necessary to
make a believable case. If the noble science of the economy is to have
an effect on the noble science of the law it must not achieve it by a
specious rhetoric of authority, arguing that economic reasoning is especially scientific or objective or some other word from the philosophical ruminations of sophomores. Economics is "scientific" in the nonEnglish meaning of "science" - systematic, thoughtful, wise. But it is
not special. Its topics of argument are mainly the general ones, the
topics of reasoning everywhere. Such topics are most apparent in that
body of "slow motion" reasoning, as James Boyd White puts it, in the
law.

* * * *
Justice Holmes said that law becomes more civilized as it becomes
more self-conscious. Economics, and law and economics, could with
30. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC bk. l, ch. 1, 1355b, at 23 (W. Roberts trans. 1954).
31. W. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF AsSENT 157 (1974).
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profit become more self-conscious about rhetoric, becoming thereby
more civilized. Another of Holmes's remarks is applicable, too. It is
more applicable perhaps to the voluntary imbeciles of science who offered him eugenic "proofs" in court than to the poor soul to whom he
in fact applied it: "Three generations of imbeciles [in positive economics] is enough."

